Philosophy Dictionary of ArgumentsHome
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| Value judgment: A value judgment is a judgment about whether a positive or negative attribute should be ascribed to a statement or thing. Value judgments have nothing to do with subjectivity, but differ from judgments about the truth of statements or judgments about the pecuniary value of a thing. See also values, judgments._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Jürgen Habermas on Value Judgments - Dictionary of Arguments
III 36 Value Judgements/Habermas: Value standards have neither the generality of intersubjectively recognized norms nor are they simply private. The actor can explain his or her preferences and dislikes to a critic by means of value judgments. >Subjectivity, >Intersubjectivity, >Norms, >Rationale._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Ha I J. Habermas Der philosophische Diskurs der Moderne Frankfurt 1988 Ha III Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. I Frankfurt/M. 1981 Ha IV Jürgen Habermas Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns Bd. II Frankfurt/M. 1981 |
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> Counter arguments against Habermas
> Counter arguments in relation to Value Judgments
Ed. Martin Schulz, access date 2024-04-29